Abstract-This paper incorporates the idea of micro-financing into bandwidth allocation in wireless networks. Resource allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks has been widely studied from the perspective of maximizing the system utilization or maximizing the carried traffic in the network. However, measurements show that the distribution of signal strength at different parts of a region is similar to the income distribution in an economic framework, wherein certain users are starved of spectrum causing "spectrum poverty" or "spectrum access poverty" to those users. This paper proposes a micro-finance model-based spectrum usage etiquette to help those with poor spectrum availability, loan spectrum from different service providers for small periods of time, and thus alleviate spectrum poverty. We price each user according to the credit history of the user. Results indicate micro-financing-based spectrum etiquette results in overall benefit for the entire system. Numerical results show 20-50% increase in the overall system utilization for the micro-finance model-based spectrum etiquette, compared to the traditional spectrum allocation model. Individually, the micro-finance model results in a 50-75% reduction in the new call blocking and 30-80% in call dropping performance for delay in-tolerant traffic and 25-50% reduction in the mean delay for delay tolerant traffic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research on micro-finance based spectrum etiquette to improve overall system performance.
Fig. 1. Signal Strength at various parts of the Holmdel area in Central New
Jersey provided by Open Signal [1] , experienced by AT& T subscribers.
complexes and those with poor coverage are residential areas where people spend most of their time at. Therefore, the users with poor or average signal strength are more starved of spectrum thus resulting in "spectrum poverty" or "spectrum access poverty". Here, by "spectrum poverty" or "spectrum access poverty", we mean being in a region of low signal strength from/to the base stations of all carriers where by users cannot improve the signal strengths by just switching carriers. The low signal strengths also imply poor data rates for these users, even if sufficient bandwidth is available at the provider. The users experiencing this poverty look to loan spectrum from multiple service providers. However, users who look to loan spectrum from alternate service providers, suffer poor signal strength at the other service provider and also suffer bandwidth scarcity at the other provider as well (e.g., in Fig. 1 , areas with poor AT&T coverage also suffer poor coverage from Verizon). Thus, a user can only obtain small chunks of bandwidth (i.e., small portions of spectrum for short periods of time) from any service provider in regions of spectrum poverty.
Obtaining smaller chunks of bandwidth reduces call blocking [2] . As an example it was observed in [2] , that when a 500 KHz carrier was used, only one user could be admitted. However, when a smaller chunk (e.g., a 100 KHz carrier was used, it admitted 3 users, while 25 KHz carriers admitted 9 users, thereby reducing blocking probability and increasing carried traffic. The amount of bandwidth requested by a user depends on the application as well as the availability of bandwidth at the location of a user. Using small portions of bandwidth for small periods of time is analogous to users borrowing small loan amounts for short periods of time in a micro-economic set up. We envision that just like good credit behavior in economic recessions increase the overall economy of a nation, when spectrum is relinquished faster in regions of poverty, it will enhance the overall performance of the system. This problem cannot simply be alleviated by scheduling, because, irrespective of the scheduling mechanism, a user holding a channel for long duration, causes adverse effects on others in regions that are already starved off spectrum [3] . While proportional fair schedulers allow equal opportunity for all users asymptotically [4] , they provide larger throughputs to users whose channel gains vary more frequently [5] . Users suffering from poor coverage are typically the far users whose variance in channel conditions is smaller because the path-loss factor is most dominant [6] and hence, proportional fair scheduler will result in fewer transmission opportunities to these users. This, provides the motivation to study spectrum allocation that (a) takes into account the heterogeneity of the users and (b) forming a spectrum usage etiquette whereby users are encouraged to use small chunks of bandwidth and relinquish them in short periods of time, to improve the overall system performance.
This paper models the problem of allocating spectrum to users with poor signal strength (i.e., users suffering from spectrum poverty), as being analogous to the problem of providing loans for poor people in various growing economies. Just like how people are provided loans with interest rates based on credit ratings, we develop a model that prices users based on their credit ratings. In economic settings, a user builds good credit if she repays a loan ahead of the deadline and loses good credit or builds bad credit if she repays the loan beyond the deadline. The larger the delay in repaying the loan, the more good credit a user loses or more the bad credit she accumulates. Similarly, we measure users' credit ratings based on the time they take to relinquish spectrum after using it.
The actual amount of spectrum assigned to users is a function of the amount of bandwidth they request and the total amount of bandwidth available at the network. 1 The spectrum allocation problem to users in a network is modeled as a fractional knapsack problem (the micro-finance model is included into the knapsack model by pricing users based on their credit ratings or rewards accrued over time). The fact that users can not only obtain spectrum from the service provider they are subscribed to but also from other service providers is captured by a game theoretic model between the service providers which determines the amount of spectrum each service provider borrows from other service providers and the amount of spectrum a service provider uses to serve its own users. We show using renewal theory, that it is possible for users to accrue as much credit score as they wish to, by reducing the times for which they borrow spectrum, which is equivalent to users repaying their loan faster, in a macro-economic set up.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed microfinance model based spectrum etiquette, we compare the performance with a model where in, users are priced only based on bandwidth usage (i.e., the traditional knapsack model). Numerical results show a possibility of 20-50% increase in the overall system utilization, when using the micro-finance model as against the traditional knapsack model. Individually, there can be a 50-75% reduction in new call blocking and 30-80% reduction in call dropping for delay intolerant traffic and 25-50% reduction in the mean delay for delay tolerant traffic, by using the micro-finance model. Our results also indicate that just like how micro-financing improved the overall economy of economically backward regions [17] , [18] , a micro-finance model based spectrum etiquette can improve the overall system performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related work is described in Section II. Section III builds the micro-finance, knapsack and game theoretic models for spectrum allocation. Numerical results are described in Section IV and conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The scarcity of spectrum made resource sharing a very important and a challenging area of research. The competition between different users to share a common spectrum resource motivated utility based game theoretic approaches to spectrum sharing. This included pricing for users bidding for multiple scarce resources [7] , resource allocation to maximize utilization (e.g., [8] and the references there in), spectrum management to incorporate price war between service providers (e.g., [9] - [11] and the references there in), or spectrum management to maximize revenue for service providers as well as maximize utilization for users [12] and spectrum management to maximize market share for service providers [13] . Pillai and Rao [14] applied game theory for and optimize resource sharing in a cloud computing environment.
In all the references mentioned above, homogeneity was assumed across all the users served by a network or a service provider, i.e., except for received signal strength, all the users are identical in their characteristics. It can be argued that this is fair enough, because the spectrum demands of all users are identical in the long run. However, users that demand bandwidth from multiple heterogeneous networks are users that find poor coverage from the service provider currently serving them. As shown in Fig. 1 , these users are likely to experience spectrum poverty at other service providers as well. Further, the argument in [3] suggests that these users will be deprived in all the networks, by users experiencing good signal strength. This motivates use to explore pricing models that price different users differently, e.g., micro-finance models for loaning spectrum.
Micro-financing [15] is a topic of extensive study of providing financial assistance (e.g., loans) to people belonging to the lower percentile of income groups by giving them credit ratings based on the time taken by the debtors to return the loan. Yunus [16] proposed the Yunus model which added the cumulative credit of users according to a geometric distribution. It was shown that micro-financing people with low income levels by giving them credit from multiple sources at low interest rates encourages them to return their loans in time and build good credit history. Augé et al. [17] applied and modified the Yunus model to show that reduced credit rates can further alleviate poverty in certain regions. Another case study in Guatemala [18] used Yunus model in conjunction with linear regression to show that micro-financing encourages people to save more than they normally would. Similar results were found in other regions like Rwanda [19] using mobile micro-financing services [20] . The key results in micro-finance motivates us to pose the following question for spectrum allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks. The game theory based approaches to pricing and spectrum sharing do not take into account, the difference in the credit behaviors of the users (i.e., their heterogeneity) and the microfinance models do not take into account the limited nature of the available resources. In the micro-finance models discussed above, a uniform discount or interest factor is applied at every stage of the process when debtors seek additional credit. Also, the available resource (i.e., the money) is considered to available in abundance. While this may be true in trading and economics (the percentage or resources demanded by debtors is insignificant compared to the total available resource), one cannot apply it directly to spectrum sharing because spectrum is a very limited resource. We develop a model that exploits the micro-financing technique of pricing users based on their credit scores while taking into account, the limited nature of the spectrum resources that are loaned.
III. SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
Consider a system with N service providers. 2 Each service provider can serve any user located anywhere, in general. Users subscribe to one service provider by default. If a user subscribes to service provider, i, then the i th service provider considers the user as a "home" user. The i th service provider has b i amount of bandwidth available. Of this, service provider i expends s i amount of resources or bandwidth to serve its own "home" users and "exports" e ij amount of bandwidth to serve users that are subscribed to service provider, j. Users subscribing to service provider i use s i amount of resources (bandwidth) from service provider i and "import" or "borrow" e ji amount of resources from service provider j. Service provider i incurs a cost, c j to borrow unit bandwidth from service provider j. The net bandwidth, B i available for users connected to service provider, i, can then be written as [13] 
Note that b i is the total amount of bandwidth procured by service provider i (which it can use to serve its home users, s i or export to other service providers), while the net bandwidth, B i , represents the bandwidth effectively used by users subscribing to service provider i (includes s i and the amount of bandwidth service provider i imports from or borrows from other service providers. The net bandwidth, B i , is now to be shared between m i users that are connected to service provider i. Note that the bandwidth borrowed from service provider i by service provider j is already taken into account by the factor e ij in B j , the net bandwidth available at service provider, j. The k th user served by the i th network is provided a bandwidth, x k takes into account, accrued credit or rewards of users) in Section III-A. Then in Section III-B, we discuss how service providers compute the amount of bandwidth that they must expend towards serving their home users, from their own available pool of bandwidth and the amount they need to borrow from other service providers.
A. The Microfonance and Traditional Knapsack Model
The k th user served by the i th network is allocated a bandwidth, x [21] . A usual choice of pricing is a linear model [21] , i.e., Also, the total bandwidth allocated to all users connected to service provider i should be no more than the net bandwidth, B i , available at service provider i. The bandwidth allocated to each user then is obtained as the solution to the optimization problem
subject to
where m i is the number of users served by the i th provider. One choice forũ
where
k is a scaling factor that indicates how much the k th user values the bandwidth. For this case, the resource allocation problem is the solution to the optimization problem,
subject to (4) . Henceforth, throughout the paper, we omit the superscripts, (i) , for the scaling factor, utility, bandwidth and price and refer to them as W k , u k , x k and ρ k , respectively, for ease of following the analysis. We want the reader to remember that each of these terms depend on i, the service provider index, as well. The optimization problem in (3) subject to (4) is a fractional knapsack problem [22] . If ρ k = ρ ∀ k and does not change with time, then this problem is the traditional fractional knapsack based spectrum allocation problem solved by
(which turns out to be (6)) equal for all users such that (4) is met with equality [23] . The key difference between the proposed micro-finance model and the traditional knapsack model is that the price per unit bandwidth changes for different users and changes with time, based on "credit ratings" accrued by a user over time. This is also the reason why the formulation of the knapsack based resource allocation problem has no factor of time included in it. Also, due to this difference, in our discussion on the micro-finance model, we focus mainly on the analysis to model ρ k as a function of time. The bandwidth, x k , does not feature in the discussion.
In our proposed micro-finance model for spectrum allocation, we make the pricing parameter, ρ k different for different users and is dynamically chosen, based on the history of spectrum hold times of user k. If the hold times are short, the user would receive a lower price than if the hold times are large, ρ k would be larger. Thus, the value of ρ k depends on the credit built by the k th user and is a function of time, t. In order to model the process, ρ k (t), as a function of time, t, consider the following argument. Each time the k th user requests a channel it holds the channel for a time,
dv , i.e., the pdf of H 1 and H l , l ≥ 2, respectively. The terms and notations used in this subsection are listed in Table I . The bandwidth allocation to users and the corresponding pricing (and hence, the credit built by a user) applies only during times they request and use the channel, which constitutes a renewal process [24] . We now apply renewal theory to develop a micro-finance model for determining the price incurred by users as a function of time, based on credit accrued by the user.
Since the non-zero portions of the channel usage by any user is a renewal process, at any interval of time, (τ, t), we can define R k (τ, t) as the credit score obtained by the k th user, in the interval (τ, t) . The price ρ k (t) at time, t, can then be evaluated as
where 
where g(y) is an increasing continuous function so that g(y L ) = −R 1 and g(y H ) = R 2 . An example is a linear reward function written as
The following theorems from renewal theory will be used to characterize the reward or credit, ρ k (t) in (7). Theorem 1 [24] [Renewal Reward Theorem (RRT)]: Consider a renewal process where the life time of the l th renewal is
For any interval (τ, t), if a reward, R(τ, t), is associated so as to obtain a cumulative reward 
Theorem 3 [24] : Consider a renewal process with life times
At any instant, t, let Y(t) be the residual life time process. Then,
where μ is given by (10).
Lemma 1:
For very large values of time, t,
where E(R k ) is the expected value of R k . Proof: Note the from Strong law of large numbers [24] ,
Therefore,
Since this is true for any , it is true for → 0, which when applied in (17) , yields that for large t (t >t corresponding to
Lemma 1 indicates that after sufficiently large amount of time, i.e., at steady state, the price per unit bandwidth paid by user k varies linearly with time, t. If E(R k ) > 0, then user k keeps paying a larger price per unit bandwidth over time. The larger price per unit bandwidth is a consequence of the accrued value of bad credit over time, which is analogous to larger rate of interest levied on a borrower with bad credit rating in a micro-finance set up. Similarly, if E(R k ) < 0, then ρ k (t) ≈ E(R k )t at steady state, indicating that the user pays lesser price per unit bandwidth as time progresses. This would be a result of good credit accrued by the user analogous to diminishing rate of interest due to good credit behavior in a micro-finance set up.
A good credit is built in a micro-finance set up by repaying loans earlier. Conversely, a bad credit is a result of delay in repayment of loans. Our goal now is to answer the following questions. 1) Q1: Analogous to repaying loans earlier, can we determine a threshold average time of relinquishing spectrum for any user, so that a user relinquishing spectrum before this threshold time accrues good credit and hence, can loan as much spectrum as desired with low price per unit bandwidth?
2) Q2: Conversely can we also show that a user who does not relinquish the spectrum within the specified threshold average time posed in Q1, accrues bad credit eventually resulting in inability to loan any spectrum after some point in time? Theorems 4 and 5 answer the questions Q1 and Q2 posed above. We first state Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 to characterize, E(R k ), which will be used in the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5.
Lemma 2:
where 3
Satisfying
Proof: See the Appendix. Lemma 3:
Proof: Note that μ
Therefore μ k → 0 indicates infinite mean for the hold time (a random variable with a one sided CDF and pdf), i.e., Pr{Y > y H } → 1 [25] , i.e., E(R k ) = R 2 . The first two statements in (22) follow by putting E(R k ) = R 2 in (18).
When μ k → ∞, the mean hold time approaches zero, indicating Pr{Y < y L } → 1 by Markov inequality [25] , i.e., E(R k ) = −R 1 , which when put in (18) yields the last two statements of (22) .
Theorem 4: For the k th user, ∃μ k > 0 and t * > 0, so that whenever μ k ≥μ k , i.e., if the user holds the channel for a mean time, E(X k ) ≤ 1 μ k , then, for t > t * , the user accrues sufficient good credit so that the network allocates as large a bandwidth to the user as possible.
Proof: As observed earlier, from Lemma 1, for large t, F(v, μ k ) , the range is 3 It is observed that the CDF, F(v) in (19) and (20) compact and connected if and only if the domains are compact and connected [26] .
The
, which is connected because it is an interval and compact because it is closed an bounded [26] .
that results in E(R k ) = 0. For a non-oscillatory CDF, F(v, μ k ), the number of zeroes to (23) are finite [27] . Letμ k be the largest of all the zeroes of (23) . According to Lemma 3, whenever μ k >μ k , E(R k ) < 0 since E(R k ) is continuous. Therefore, whenever user k relinquishes the spectrum within a mean time less that
is then a monotone increasing function of x k indicating that user k can receive as much bandwidth as possible as long as constraint (4) is satisfied.
The value ofμ k is obtained by solving the transcendental equation (23) iteratively. The Newton-Raphson method [28] is guaranteed to find the zeroes when they exist [29] . Theorem 4 essentially shows how, by relinquishing channel fast enough, users have a long term incentive of receiving as large a bandwidth as can be allocated.
It is observed that this model of accrued credit only comes from the micro-finance model and not in the traditional game theoretic or knapsack approaches because in those models rewards, prices are homogeneous and there is no incentive to relinquish channel early to accrue any credit.
We now formulate following theorem to answer question Q2 posed earlier on the existence of the upper bound on the holding time above which, users suffer bad long term credit.
Theorem 5: There existsμ k > 0,t > 0, so that if user k holds the channel for a mean time larger than 1 μ k , then ∀t >t, the k th user receives zero bandwidth.
Proof: Consider the zeroes of (23) . Letμ k be the smallest of the zeroes. The continuity of
, u k is maximum for x k = 0, i.e., user k is allocated bandwidth x k = 0.
Theorem 5 then suggests that apart from a long term incentive implied by Theorem 4 , there is also a long term penalty associated with not relinquishing a channel fast enough. Theorems 4 and 5 together provide a micro-finance model based spectrum etiquette whereby users are encouraged to relinquish spectrum fast enough, so that they perceive long term benefits. Also, Theorems 4 and 5 only provide an average behavior for users, i.e., an average time before which users need to relinquish spectrum in order to accrue good credit. This means that even if on certain occasions users do hold the channel for a long period of time, they can make up for it by relinquishing the spectrum earlier in future occasions. Theorems 4 and 5 are valid for non-linear pricing models too.
The difference would be in the actual values ofμ k ,μ k and the timet andt after which these Theorems apply.
It is observed that the micro-finance extension of the traditional knapsack model presented in this sub-section is dependent on the net bandwidth, B i , available at service provider, i, from the constraint (4). The net available bandwidth, B i , depends on the amount of bandwidth service provider i uses, s i , from its own pool of resources, b i , and the amount of resources it borrows from other service providers, e ji , j = i, from (1). In the following subsection, we describe a noncooperative game theoretic framework that determines the optimal values of e ji and s i .
B. Network Service Provider Game
Now, we develop a non-cooperative game between the network service providers that determine the amount of bandwidth they use for users that are connected to them (i.e., the "home" users), s i and the amount of bandwidth they would "import" from service provider, j, e ji . The optimal values are those that maximize the payoff for service provider i. The payoff perceived by the i th provider should take the following into consideration. 1) As s i increases, the payoff for provider i increases as more bandwidth is utilized to serve more home users. However, it decreases when the congestion experienced at any service provider increases. The congestion at provider i is measured based on the remaining bandwidth at provider i, i.e., b i − s i − l =i e il , where e il is the bandwidth "exported" or "lent" by provider i to provider l. 2) As the amount of bandwidth borrowed from provider j, e ji , increases, the pay off for provider i increases as it allows users connected to provider i to get additional bandwidth. However, as mentioned in requirement 1) above, if the borrowed bandwidth causes congestion in network j (i.e., if b j − s j − l =j e jl increases), then the pay off perceived by provider i decreases. 3) For every unit bandwidth procured from provider j, provider i incurs a cost, c j . Taking the above into account, the payoff for provider i, π i , can be written as
The first term in (24) satisfies requirement 1) mentioned above, the second term satisfies requirement 2) and the last term takes into account requirement 3). The payoff function in (24) is a concave function and hence, the non-cooperative game between the WSP's results in a unique Nash equilibrium [21] , which can be obtained from the first order necessary conditions,
Applying the above to π i in (24), we obtain the system of linear equations,
In [13] , we presented solution to a set of linear equations with a similar set of co-efficients. However, the set of co-efficients and constants on the right hand side were different. We use the same technique we used in [13] to solve the system of linear equations in (26) to obtain
Then, the net bandwidth available for user at network i, B i can then be written as [13] ,
This value of B i is used on constraint (4) in Section III-A.
If the values of s * i or e ji * turn out negative, they are taken to be zero.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For the numerical simulations we consider the following parameters. We consider a system with 4 service providers (typically in USA, the major service providers are Sprint, T-Mobile, AT&T and Verizon with an available bandwidth adjusted so that the net available bandwidth at each service provider is about 1-100 MHz for each provider, which is about 2.5-5 times the maximum LTE system bandwidth. In each network, we generate users with received signal strengths according to the distribution observed in the maps in Figs. 1 and 2 . We apply the utility functionũ k as in (5) and the linear reward model in (9) . For each user with signal strength percentile, s, we consider W k in (5) as W k = s (As mentioned in Section III-A, we omit the superscript (i) for simplicity). The penalty R 2 is taken to be 1.2. This stems from the fact that an increasing rate of compound interest of 19.74% was applied in the Yunus model [16] and in [17] . To keep the same average, we apply a rate of interest of 20% and make R 2 = 1.2 to take into account that the penalty is 1+rate of interest. Since we need R 1 < R 2 and R 1 > 0, we use the model in [19] and [20] , where users are rewarded at a rate of less than 10% at which they are penalized. Hence, we take R 1 = 1.02 (reward rate taken to be 2%). We ran about 1 million simulation experiments where requests arrived according to a Poisson process with a rate of 300/hr and call holding times are exponentially distributed [30] , [31] . For the values of R 1 and R 2 , we computeμ k andμ k by solving (23) . iteratively. Then we generate for each user with signal strength percentage, s,
s 100 so as to have users with 75-150% of μ k . Also, users that experience better signal quality are likely to hold the bandwidth for a longer time [32] . With these we First, we study the over-all impact of the micro-finance model on the performance of the system. For studying the performance, we use normalized net utility and normalized throughput as the metric. The normalized net utility is the average net utility of all the users normalized so that the largest average net utility is normalized to 1. Fig. 3 shows the normalized net utility obtained using the traditional knapsack and the micro-finance models. It is observed that the micro-finance model results in larger average net utility.
The throughput for delay in-tolerant traffic is the actual rate of transmission experienced by the fraction that were neither blocked, nor dropped. For delay tolerant traffic, it is defined as the ratio between the packet length and the delay suffered. The average throughput is the average throughput of all delay tolerant and delay intolerant traffic. This is then normalized against the peak data rate supported by the system and then further normalized by considering the largest of all the normalized throughput to be 1. Fig. 4 shows that the proposed microfinance model can achieve upto 20-50% additional throughput at bandwidths of 40 MHz, which is typical of LTE systems. This shows that the proposed micro-finance model for spectrum management results in an over-all improved utilization of the system resources.
We argue that the main reason for the enhanced throughput performance of the micro-finance model is that it results is fewer blocked and dropped calls for delay in-tolerant traffic and smaller delay for delay tolerant traffic. To verify this, we first consider delay intolerant traffic and measure the fraction of new calls that are blocked due to lack of sufficient bandwidth. Fig. 5 depicts the new call dropping probability ( Fig. 5(a) ) and the active call dropping (Fig. 5(b) ). The dropping probability is evaluated as some users losing bandwidth when a new user comes in due to which the optimization problem in (6) subject to (4) with varying ρ k 's is recomputed. In such a case the user is handed over to another network. If no network is able to serve the user, the call is dropped. It is observed that as the available bandwidth increases, the call dropping and call blocking probabilities reduce as expected. However, for small values of available bandwidth, the call blocking reduces by about upto 50% (at about 40 MHz)-75% (at about 5 MHz) for the micro-finance model. It is noted that users experiencing poor signal strength will also perceive poor available bandwidth and the micro-finance model helps such users because of its improved performance. Similarly, the call dropping probability can improve by 30% (at an available bandwidth of 40 MHz) to upto 78% (at an available bandwidth of 5 MHz).
We then measure the mean delay suffered by delay tolerant traffic when deploying the micro-finance model and the knapsack model (Fig. 6) . The maximum delay suffered by a user over both the models is normalized to 100. All other values are shown relative to the normalized value. It is observed that at low available bandwidths, the mean delay improves by upto 25% (at an available bandwidth of 40 MHz) to about 47% (at an available bandwidth of 5 MHz) in when the micro-finance model is applied. Overall, it is observed that the micro-finance model improves the performance both for delay intolerant traffic as well as for delay tolerant traffic. Finally, we study the fraction of users whose μ k is larger than theμ k , thus enabling them to obtain a bandwidth as large as desired. Fig. 7 depicts this behavior. It is observed that the probability, Pr{μ >μ k } increases when the user experiences lower signal strength. This is because, these users experience lower value, W k and it encourages them to relinquish the channel earlier so that the utility can be maximized. This once again confirms the fact that users experiencing signal and hence spectrum poverty are likely to be more inclined to build better credit history in order to experience a long term benefit of more bandwidth, later. This behavior was observed among the poorer section of the society as seen in the economic models in [17] - [19] . By suitably modifying the parameters, R 1 and R 2 in (9) and from Theorems 4 and 5, one can guarantee a minimum bandwidth to all users using the micro-finance model, which cannot be achieved by the knapsack model thus indicating again that Fig. 7 . The probability that the k th user releases the channel at a rate faster than the threshold rate,μ k , specified in Theorem 4. Users at lower percentile of received signal strength, i.e., those that experience spectrum poverty are likely to release the channel earlier, improving their credit scores and thus enjoying as much bandwidth as they need.
micro-financing spectrum may help alleviate spectrum poverty. Further, in the knapsack model, there is no incentive for users to release the channel earlier and hence, they hold the channel for a longer time. The micro-finance model encourages users to release the channel at a faster rate, which enables other users to use the channel too. This is equivalent to saying that micro-finance models for spectrum allocation is more socially optimal.
V. CONCLUSION
We developed a micro-finance model for spectrum allocation by pricing users according to their credit behavior. We showed that users have an incentive to build good credit by relinquishing the channel earlier. This specifically applies to users who suffer poor signal strength and when the available bandwidth is small. The micro-finance model improved the call blocking and call dropping performance for delay intolerant traffic and the mean delay performance for delay tolerant traffic. The findings indicate that micro-financing spectrum may help allocate a minimum bandwidth to all users and thus alleviate spectrum poverty.
APPENDIX PROOF OF LEMMA 2
From the definition of R k in (8) ,
which, using KRT (Theorem 2) and Theorem 3 becomes
Using the fact that for any function, H(v), 
Alternatively, E(R k ) can also be written as
whereÎ(y L , y H , μ k ) is defined aŝ
Note from (8) and (9), that g(v) is an increasing function with minimum value −R 1 and maximum value R 2 . Therefore, g( 
